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The Joint Effect of Health Shocks and Eligibility for
Social Security on Labor Supply
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Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not suffering a health shock, and becoming
eligible for Social Security, have a joint effect on labor supply. Despite millions of
people experiencing both of these events each year, no paper has focused exclusively
on the joint effect that these events may have on work outcomes. This is surprising
given that experiencing a health shock may impact on how a worker responds to
becoming eligible for Social Security. With data from the Health and Retirement
Study, I model weekly hours of work as a function of health shocks, Social Security
eligibility, and their interaction. I find that this interaction leads to a 3 to 4 hour
reduction in weekly hours of work for men but has no effect for women. The results
are robust to using different work outcomes, age groups, health shock definitions,
subgroups, as well as falsification and placebo tests. The results appear to be driven
by men who would have had to return to work with impaired health. Policies that
promote a more flexible work situation for older men may alleviate these problems
in the future.
JEL classification: J22; J26; I10; H55.
Keywords: Labor Supply; Health Shocks; Social Security.
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1 Introduction
Both health shocks and access to Social Security payments have been shown to have
negative effects on labor supply. While the separate effects that each of these events have
on labor supply are well known there has been a dearth of research focusing on the joint
effect that they may have. However, there are a number of reasons why research on this
joint effect is warranted. The first reason is the sheer number of people who experience
these events each year. For example, each year in the U.S., 735,000 people have a heart
attack [1], 795,000 have a stroke [2], and 1.7 million people are diagnosed with cancer
[3]. Similarly, in 2017, the Social Security Administration reported that 5.5 million new
people gained access to Social Security benefits [4]. While the number of people who
would be considered relevant for public policy is smaller than this (for example, 18% of
those diagnosed with cancer will die in the first year [5] and, of those that survive, only
64% will return to work [6]), it is important for policy makers to be aware of any joint
effect that these events may have since it has the potential to affect such large numbers
of the population.
The second reason is the timing of the events. This is because workers experience both
of these events at roughly the same age. Workers become eligible for early Social Security
payments from the age of 62 and eligible for full benefits from the age of 65 (which is rising
to 67). Meanwhile, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
health statistics report, 25% of the people who report being diagnosed with cancer are
between the age of 65-74 [7]. Similar number are available for stroke (24%), heart disease
(22%), emphysema (27%), and chronic bronchitis (13%)[7]. Given that there will be a
large number of workers who experience both these events simultaneously, examining the
effect of health shocks without considering the joint effect of Social Security eligibility
could lead to us ignoring important information on the workers’ labor supply decisions.
The third reason is that, given the nature of the two events, it is very likely that
they have some sort of interaction with one another. Workers who have had a health
shock may want to reduce their labor supply but can’t because they still need to work,
while Social Security allows people to reduce their labor supply while maintaining a flow
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of income. It is easy to imagine how workers who have had a health shock might react
differently to becoming eligible for Social Security compared to workers who have not
had a health shock.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I model work outcomes as a
function of a health shock, becoming eligible for Social Security, and their interaction.
I find that the interaction between health shocks and Social Security eligibility leads
to an approximately 3 - 4 hour reduction in the number of weekly hours worked for
men, while the interaction has no effect on the number of hours worked for women.
This reduction in labor supply occurs at the extensive margin for men as it leads to an
approximate 6 - 10 percentage point fall in the probability of working. The interaction
has no effect at the intensive margin for women but has a small effect for men. The results
are also robust to using different age groups, different health shock definitions, different
subgroups, falsification tests, and placebo tests. The effects appear to be driven by how
much the respondents’ health is limiting their work. Male respondents who have had a
health shock and remain working are more likely to report that their health is limiting
their work compared to male workers who have not had a health shock. This effect is
absent for women. This suggests that the mechanism behind the result is men returning
to work before they have fully recovered from the health shock. This is supported by the
fact that this effect is only present for men who work at least 40 hours per week, but not
present for men who work fewer than 40 hours per week. Policies that promote a flexible
working environment such as reduced daily hours, a reduced work week, or the option to
work from home on certain days, could be used to prevent such sudden withdrawals from
the labor market in the future.
This paper fills a gap in the literature by examining the joint effect of health shocks
with Social Security eligibility. While there have been papers which have considered the
joint effects of health shocks in the presence of disability insurance [8], or labor shocks in
the presence of Social Security eligibility [9], no paper has thoroughly examined the joint
effect of health shocks with Social Security eligibility. Knowing the joint effect that health
shocks and Social Security eligibility has on labor supply can help contribute towards the
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development of public policy in numerous ways. From the worker’s perspective, if they are
returning to work too soon it may delay their recovery time. From the firm’s perspective,
if workers are returning to work before they have returned to full health then this may
affect the firm’s productivity. In this case, both the worker and the firm may benefit from
an extended recovery period for the worker. Also, from the government’s perspective, the
associated strain placed on public finances by Social Security and Medicare due to an
aging population can be alleviated by knowing how and why it is that the workers are
reducing their labor supply. For example, policies designed to retain workers in the labor
force and prevent exits are likely to differ from policies aimed at allowing people who are
already in the labor force to modify their hours of work.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 discusses the related
literature. The econometric model and data are outlined in section 3. The results are
presented in section 4 and their robustness is examined in section 5. Section 6 discusses
the results and possible mechanisms behind them. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Regarding previous studies, the negative effect that health shocks have on employment
outcomes have been well documented throughout the world. Evidence from the U.S. [10];
[11]; [12]; [13]; [14]; [15], Australia [16], Canada [17], Denmark [12], Germany [18], the
Netherlands [19], Spain [20], the UK [21]; [22]; [23]; [24], and Europe as a whole [25];
[26], shows that health shocks have negative consequences for the probability of working,
hours of work, and personal finances. While the definition of a health shock varies greatly
by study, a common measure is to define it as suffering from an acute health event such as
cancer, heart problems, lung disease, or stroke1. Other research using exogenous variation
in health shocks such as road injuries [43] and commuting accidents [44] have also found
negative effects of health shocks on work outcomes.
1More recently, a new strand of literature has emerged which focuses specifically on the effect of
cancer on labor supply. Evidence from the U.S. [27]; [28]; [29]; [30]; [31]; [32]; [33]; [34]; [35], Europe [36];
[37]; [38]; [39]; [40], and elsewhere [41]; [42], shows that cancer, like other health shocks, has generally
been found to have a negative effect on labor supply.
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In the U.S., Social Security is the name for the federal program which provides old-
age benefits for workers once they reach a certain age. Historically, the age at which
people become eligible for full payments was 65, however this is being raised to 67. It is
also possible to become eligible for early (but reduced) payments from the age of 62. The
reduction is between 20-25% depending on whether the worker’s full retirement age is 65 or
66. With regards to Social Security, the effect that it has on labor supply is resoundingly
negative. Using structural models, Gustman and Steinmeier [45] show that the peaks
observed in retirement behavior at 62 and 65 are due to Social Security and pension
payments. Gustman and Steinmeier [46] also show that if the early entitlement age for
Social Security benefits were to be delayed until 64 it could induce 5% of the population to
delay retiring. Ferreira and dos Santos [47] use a life-cycle general equilibrium approach
to show that the increase in generosity of Social Security benefits (and the introduction
of Medicare) accounts for most of the increase in the number of retirements over the
period from 1950 to 2000. Blau [48] uses a hazard model to show that Social Security
benefits have large effects on labor force transitions, while other elements of workers
budget constraints appear relatively unimportant. In the reduced form literature, Krueger
and Pischke [49] use the 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act to show Social
Security benefits have a negative, though extremely modest, effect on labor supply. Also,
Mastrobuoni [50] finds that the incremental increase of the normal retirement age by
two months per year for cohorts born in 1938 (and after) increases the age at which the
effected cohorts retire by half as a much as the increase in the normal retirement age.
See Coile [51] for an excellent review of the surrounding literature.
One effect that has not been well documented is the joint effect of suffering a health
shock and being eligible for Social Security. The only other paper to examine the joint
effect is Coile [11]. In her examination of the effects of health shocks on couples’ labor
supply decisions, Coile finds that health shocks have negative effects on the labor supply
of men and women. She also interacts whether the respondent is diagnosed with a health
shock and whether they are eligible for Social Security. The effect of a health shock
on those who are not eligible for Social Security is still negative and significant but the
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coefficient on the interaction term is very small and not statistically different from zero.
While this is the same model that I will be estimating in this paper, it is important to
notice that there are several substantive differences between the two papers. While we
both use data from the Health and Retirement Study, Coile [11] only uses data from
waves 1 to 6. I use almost twice as many waves, using all available waves from 1 to 11.
Similarly, Coile [11] uses an age range of 50 to 69 while the age range used in this analysis
is 60 to 63, with smaller age bands either side of the eligibility threshold used in some
of the analyses. Finally, this paper presents a robust examination of this model with
different specifications and subgroups while the estimation of this model in Coile [11] was
itself a robustness check.
3 Methods and Data
3.1 Empirical model and estimation
In order to estimate the joint effect of a health shock and being eligible for Social Security
on labor supply, I model work outcomes (Y ) as a function of becoming eligible for Social
Security (ESS), a health shock (HS), and their interaction (ESS × HS). This can be
summarized by the following econometric equation,
Yit = β0 + β1ESSit + β2HSit + β3(ESSit ×HSit) + uit, (1)
where i indexes an individual and t indexes a time period. The main outcome measure
which will be used in the analysis is hours of work per week. Hours of work is a continuous
variable (for positive values). If a worker is not working then their hours are set to zero
(from missing). ESS status is measured with a binary variable which refers to whether
the respondent is eligible for Social Security. I follow Coile [11] and Coile and Levine [9]
and define the respondent as eligible if they are 62 or older in period t and ineligible if
they are younger2. HS status will be represented as another binary variable indicating
2Coile and Levine [9] interact Social Security eligibility ages (62, 63, and 64) with unemployment
insurance, rather than health shocks, but the idea is the same.
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whether they have suffered a HS. Respondents in the HRS are asked “Since we last talked
to you, that is since [last interview date], has a doctor told you that you have . . . ”
and a number of conditions are listed. While previous studies have defined HS in many
different ways, I follow Smith [14] and define a HS as a current diagnosis of cancer, heart
problems, stroke, or lung disease3.
For the estimators of the parameters in the model to be unbiased, the conditional
mean assumption,
E(uit|ESSit, HSit) = E(uit), (2)
needs to be met. Since ESS status is exogenously determined by an age threshold, ESS
status can be thought of as being as good as randomly assigned for the respondents just
above the threshold and just below the threshold. If ESS is randomly assigned then the
following condition is satisfied,
E(uit|ESSit) = E(uit), (3)
which means that ESS status is not correlated with the error term. In this case, the
estimators of parameters β1 and β3 will be unbiased, even if HS status is correlated
with the error term, and equation (1) can be estimated including only the ESS, HS, and
interaction variables. To see this, look at the effect of a HS on work outcomes for those
who are ESS,
E(Yit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 1)− E(Yit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 0)
= β2 + β3 + E(uit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 1)− E(uit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 0),
(4)
and those who are not ESS,
E(Yit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 1)− E(Yit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 0)
= β2 + E(uit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 1)− E(uit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 0).
(5)
3In the HRS, the cancer variable is defined as cancer or a malignant tumor of any kind except skin
cancer. The heart problems variable is defined as heart attack, coronary heart disease, angina, congestive
heart failure, or other heart problems. Stroke is defined as stroke or transient ischemic attack. Lung
disease is defined as chronic lung disease except asthma such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema.
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In this case, β2 represents both the direct effect of HS on outcomes for the ESS group and
the total effect of HS on outcomes for the non-ESS group. The causal effect of interest,
the joint effect of HS and ESS on labor supply, can then be identified by subtracting
equation (5) from equation (4),
E(Yit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 1)− E(Yit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 0)
− (E(Yit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 1)− E(Yit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 0))
= β3.
(6)
It is important to notice that equation (6) does not contain the error terms that were
listed in equations (4) and (5) as they have been differenced out. However, this result
does not rely on the error terms within equations (4) and (5) being equal. In fact, I expect
respondents who suffer HS to have different unobservables compared to respondents who
do not suffer HS. In this case, the identification of the interaction parameter comes from
the fact that I expect those who are ESS to have the same unobservables as those who
are not ESS, conditional on whether or not they receive a HS. If ESS status is randomly
assigned, then the following conditions hold,
E(uit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 1) = E(uit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 1), (7)
E(uit|ESSit = 1, HSit = 0) = E(uit|ESSit = 0, HSit = 0), (8)
and the parameter β3 can be identified as these errors are differenced out across equations
(4) and (5).
While it is easy to imagine the random assignment criteria being met for respondents
who are slightly above and slightly below the threshold age of 62, it is harder to justify
for the entire sample which will contain respondents as young as 60 and as old as 63. It
is possible that the respondents who are 62 - 63 could have different unobservables to
the respondents who are 60 - 61. In this case, it may be more appropriate to adjust the
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model to take this into account. This can be done with the following equation,
Yit = β0 + β1ESSit + β2HSit + β3(ESSit ×HSit) + αi + θt + eit, (9)
where αi represents an individual-specific fixed effect, θt represents time period fixed
effects, and eit is the traditional idiosyncratic error. If ESS status cannot be treated as
randomly assigned then αi needs to be included in the model in order for the conditional
mean assumption in equation (2) to be satisfied. To be specific, an example of αi would
be something like smoking behavior which both determines your labor supply (smokers
are less likely to work than non-smokers) and is related to HS status (smoking increases
the risk of all the diseases included as HS) and ESS status (ESS respondents who are older
may be more likely to smoke than non-ESS respondents who are younger). Omitting this
variable from the regression would cause bias in the estimators since it both determines
the outcomes and is correlated with ESS and HS. While confounding variables such
as smoking behavior can be observed and included in the model there are often other
variables which fulfill these characteristics that are unobserved. Fortunately, this problem
can be overcome by removing αi from this equation with differencing. Taking the first-
difference of equation (9) gives
∆Yit = θt + β1∆ESSit + β2∆HSit + β3∆(ESSit ×HSit) + ∆eit. (10)
In this case, the estimators of parameters β1 and β3 will be unbiased if the following
conditional mean assumption is met,
E(∆eit|∆ESSit) = E(∆eit). (11)
What this assumption means is that any change in ESS status is unrelated to changes in
the error term. For ESS status, given that this change is based on an age threshold, it
should not be related to changes in the error term and this condition should be satisfied.
In fact, it is also plausible that the condition E(∆eit|∆HSit) = E(∆eit) is satisfied given
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that the shocks included in the model are the onset of sudden, severe conditions such as
cancer diagnosis or stroke. The assumption that the effect of health shocks on employment
can be identified by differencing away any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is
standard within the health shock literature since experimental or quasi-experimental
methods cannot be used with the data at hand (see Garcia-Gomez et al.[19], Trevisan
and Zantomio [26], and Candon [32] for examples). Empirical evidence to support the
assumptions that underpin the two models is presented in the final two subsections of
this section.
In all models, the parameters are estimated using OLS. Because an individual can appear
in more than one observation, the standard errors in the regression analysis are clustered
at the individual level to correct for any serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
3.2 Data
The data used in this analysis comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The
HRS is a longitudinal study of aging set in the U.S. and it contains information on the
employment status, health status, and Social Security status, of the respondents4. It is
a biennial survey and the first 11 survey waves, spanning the years 1992 to 2012, are
included here. The version used here is the RAND version which combines and cleans all
11 waves.
The following restrictions are imposed on the data. The respondents must be working
in period t−1 in order to observe the effect of health shocks and Social Security on labor
supply. This means there must be at least two periods of data for each individual. They
also cannot be ESS (62 or older) in period t − 1 so as to observe their pre-ESS labor
market behavior. This restriction extends to any other Social Security program, such
as Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income, for the same
reason. This means that any not ESS to ESS transition is unique, though respondents
may appear multiple times with regards to their not ESS work behavior. In period t,
4The HRS [52] is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740)
and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
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I remove workers who are over the age of 65 to remove any confounding effect from
eligibility to Medicare. This also means there is only one type of eligibility for Social
Security payments, early eligibility. In order to make sure those who are ESS and not
ESS are as similar as possible, I also remove respondents who are below the age of 60
and above the age of 63 in period t. Therefore, the respondents are ESS in period t if
they are between the ages of 62 - 63 and not ESS if they are between the ages of 60 - 61.
These and the other minors restrictions which are imposed are presented in more detail
in Table A1 of the Appendix. Imposing these restrictions leaves a final sample of 11,967
observations. Because this is a panel data set, individuals may appear more than once.
Of the 11,967 observations, 7,872 are unique individuals. This mean that there are 7,872
individuals that I observe at least two periods of information for, with some individuals
providing three periods of information. The age distribution of the respondents left in
the sample is presented in Table 1. The observations are separated by sex because the
econometric models will be estimated separately for men and women.
Some additional variables, measured in period t − 1, will be added as controls in
some analysis. These include indicator variables for whether the respondent is not white,
whether they have a college education (some or full), and whether they are married
(or partnered). Some health related variables that are included are whether they have
had a health shock, whether they are in poor or fair health (as opposed to good, very
good, or excellent health), whether they have ever smoked, whether they smoke now,
whether they drink alcohol, and whether they are obese (BMI ≥ 30). I also include some
variables related to the respondents’ working life such as whether or not they have a
spouse who works, whether they are self-employed, whether they have employer-provided
health insurance, whether they have a physical job, and their weekly hours of work.
Information on the respondents’ earnings and their household income are also included.
These variables are adjusted to 2011 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation
calculator and included with an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation5. This
transformation can be thought of as similar to the logarithmic transformation. However,
5This transformation of wealth, W , is w = ln(W +
√
W 2 + 1).
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IHS is preferred since it behaves like the logarithmic function for positive values but does
not exclude cases where the variable is negative or zero.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
The assumption underpinning the first model presented was that I expect the respondents
who are ESS to have the same unobservables as those who are not ESS, conditional on
whether or not they receive a HS. While this assumption is fundamentally untestable
since it involves unobservables it is possible to check how plausible it is by seeing if it
is satisfied for observable characteristics. This can be done by examining the descriptive
statistics for both groups. These are presented in Table 2. I break down the descriptive
statistics of the sample by their HS status and ESS status in period t. The first panel
contains information on potential control variables, measured at their period t− 1 level,
before anyone is ESS. While I expect to find differences between respondents who suffer
HS and those who don’t, I expect to find that the ESS and non-ESS groups are similar
when being compared within HS status. Indeed, this is exactly what I find. When
comparing columns (1) to (2), (3) to (4) etc. it is possible to see that there is little
difference between the ESS and non-ESS groups. If these groups appear equivalent based
on their observable characteristics then it lends support to the idea that they are also
balanced with respect to their unobservable characteristics. Further descriptive statistics
containing information on standard deviations, and statistically significant differences
between the groups, are contained in the Appendix in Tables A2 and A3.
The second panel includes information on employment outcomes for the groups in
period t. Men who are ESS are less likely to be employed and work fewer hours compared
to men who are not ESS. Similarly, men who have suffered a HS are less likely to be
employed and work fewer hours compared to men who have not had a HS. The men who
are have suffered a HS, and are ESS, have the worst work outcomes. The situation is
slightly different for women. While the women who are ESS work less than the women
who are not ESS, this effect varies little by HS status. In short, the effect of being ESS
on work outcomes differs based on HS status for men but does not appear to differ based
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on HS status for women. This will be a common feature of the econometric analysis
presented in the Results section.
3.4 Trends over time
The main assumption underpinning the second model is that changes in ESS status are
unrelated to changes in unobservables. In order to justify this assumption, I demonstrate
that the ESS group and the non-ESS group have similar outcome trajectories over time.
To do this, I plot the proportion of the respondents who report themselves as being in
poor health for each of the four groups. I have chosen the poor health variable since
it should obviously be different for the HS and non-HS groups but no difference should
be observed within the groups based on ESS status. The plots are also done separately
for men and women and they are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Again, the pattern is
similar to the one which was observed for the descriptive statistics. The groups which
have HS have worse health outcomes than the groups which do not have HS. However,
within the HS group, there is no difference in health outcomes based on ESS status. Also,
within the non-HS group, there is no difference in health outcomes based on ESS status.
In fact, none of the differences between the ESS and non-ESS groups are statistically
significant at the 10% level for either men or women at any time period in the graphs.
Taken together, the information presented in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show that the
groups should not differ by ESS status and that I should be able to identify the joint
effect of HS and ESS on labor supply.
4 Results
4.1 The effect of health shocks and eligibility for Social Security
on hours of work
Panel A in Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) by OLS for both men
and women. The first column shows that men who are eligible for Social Security, and
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who have not suffered a health shock, work 6.9 fewer hours per week compared to men
who have not suffered a health shock and are not eligible for Social Security. Men who
have suffered a health shock, but are not eligible for Social Security, work 1.7 fewer hours
per week compared to that same group. The men who have suffered a health shock, and
who are eligible for Social Security, work 3 hours fewer compared to the men who are
either only eligible for Social Security, or who have only suffered a health shock. This
interaction coefficient tells us that men who are eligible for Social Security, and suffer a
health shock, reduce their labor supply at a greater rate than men who are only eligible for
Social Security, even after taking the direct effect of a health shock into account. In other
words, how the male workers react to becoming eligible for Social Security differs based
on whether or not they have had a health shock, even if the reduction in labor supply due
to that shock has already been controlled for. In the second column, I add in the period
t− 1 control variables listed in Table 2, and some wave and region dummy variables, and
the interaction coefficient increases slightly in magnitude to 3.1. The coefficient on the
interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% level in both models. For women,
the interpretation of the coefficients remains the same but the results are quite different.
The third and fourth columns show that while the coefficients on eligibility for Social
Security and health shock both have the expected negative sign, the interaction effect is
not significantly different from zero in either specification.
Panel B shows the results from the first-difference model. Because one of the restrictions
imposed on the sample was that respondents had to be working in period t − 1, no
observations are lost in the first-difference model. Again, this shows that even after the
reduction in hours due to the health shock is taken into account, the men who are both
eligible for Social Security and have suffered a health shock work 4.5 hours fewer than
the men who are just eligible for Social Security. The addition of wave dummies to this
model has very little effect. For women, the interaction coefficient is very small and not
significantly different from zero in either specification. These two results are repeated
throughout the rest of this paper: the effect of this interaction on male labor supply is
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negative and statistically significant while the effect of this interaction on female labor
supply is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
4.2 Using different employment outcomes
In the original models, there were three important variables: the outcome variable; the
eligibility for Social Security variable; and the health shock variable. I now re-estimate
the models using different classifications for each of these variables to see how sensitive the
results are to these changes. I begin by using different employment outcomes. This will
help us understand whether the reduction in labor supply takes place at the extensive
margin or the intensive margin. I now estimate the hours of work models with the
restriction that the respondents must be working in period t. As can be seen from Panel
A in Table 4, men and women who are eligible for Social Security, but have not had a
health shock, do reduce the number of hours that they work even if they are still working
in period t. Workers who suffer a health shock, but are not eligible for Social Security, do
not reduce their labor supply if they return to work. What is interesting in this analysis
is that the interaction coefficient is not statistically significant in the pooled model for
men, but it is statistically significant a the 5% level in the first-difference model. Despite
the fact that both results are qualitatively similar at between 1.2 -1.5 hours, they are
smaller than the coefficients in Table 3, which were between 3 - 4.5 hours. For women
the effect is still close to zero. So while being eligible for Social Security may help men
who suffer a health shock to reduce the number of hours they work, it appears that it
plays only a small role in allowing them to reduce the number of hours they work within
a job.
If the reductions are not coming at the intensive margin it should be the case that I find
reductions at the extensive margin. To check this, I now replace the dependent variable
with a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent is working. Respondents
are recorded as working if they report working full-time, part-time, or part-retired and
recorded as not working if they report being unemployed, retired, disabled, or not in the
labor force. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. The first two columns show
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that men who are eligible for Social Security and suffer a health shock are between 6
and 10 percentage points less likely to be working than respondents who are just eligible
for Social Security. This means that they are more likely to stop working compared to
the respondents who are only eligible for Social Security, even after taking the negative
effect of the health shock into account. For women, the interaction coefficient is positive
in one model, and negative in another, but it is never statistically different from zero. In
summary, the results are the same as in Table 3: the interaction has a significant negative
effect on male labor supply, while it has no effect on female labor supply.
4.3 Using different age groups
A potential problem when using this type of estimation strategy is that, while the
unobservables between respondents either side of the exogenous threshold may be identical,
they differ the further you move away from that threshold. In this analysis, this translates
into a concern that respondents who are 61 and 62 may be comparable, but not those who
are 60 and 63. In order to test how sensitive the results are to the age of the respondents,
I re-estimate the model using different age groups. The results are presented in Panel
A of Table 5 and there is little difference between these results and those presented in
Table 3. This shows that including respondents who are two years away from the age
threshold gives similar results to including those who are only one year either side of
the age threshold. In fact, if the age band is widened to include those who are 59 to 64
then the results still have the same overall pattern. Panel B of Table 5 shows that the
interaction coefficient is slightly smaller in magnitude in both models for men, though
the results are still statistically significant at the 1% level. Once again, the coefficients
are small and statistically insignificant in the models for women. The analysis shows
that the main results are not sensitive to any one particular definition of Social Security
eligibility.
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4.4 Using different health shocks
In order to mitigate any issues surrounding the choice of variables included as a health
shock, I re-estimate the model using different definitions of the health shock variable.
Currently, the definition is based on Smith [14] where a health shock is defined as a
current diagnosis of cancer, heart problems, stroke, or lung disease. The aggregation of
these health conditions could pose a problem for two reasons. For men, it could be the
case that only one of these variables has a negative effect on labor supply but, because the
different shocks are all pooled together, it appears as if they all have a significant negative
effect. For women, it could be the exact opposite case: one of the health conditions could
have a negative effect on labor supply but it is being drowned out since it is combined
with other health conditions which do not have an effect.
I estimate the model again using four different definitions of the health shock. In each
new model I use only one of the four original health shock variables. The results from this
new set of analyses are presented in Table 6. While there are two cases where the pooled
OLS interaction coefficient is not statistically significant for men (cancer and stroke) all
of the FD interaction coefficients are significant at the 5% level. For women, it is the case
that almost all of the interaction coefficients are still not statistically different form zero.
However, the interaction coefficient in the FD model for strokes is statistically significant
at the 10% level, and it is relatively large in magnitude when compared with the results
from previous tables. So while the overall picture for women appears to be that becoming
eligible for Social Security has no effect on the women who suffer health shocks, it may
be the case that women who have suffered a stroke are more likely to reduce their labor
supply once they become eligible for Social Security, in the same way that men do.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Placebo tests
One concern with the results is that it is not the receipt of Social Security which is
exogenously determined but eligibility for Social Security. Not every respondent who is
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eligible for Social Security will avail of Social Security. This means that it is possible that
the estimates observed in the previous regressions could simply be due to the interaction
between health shock status and advancing age, and that being eligible for Social Security
plays no role in the reduction of labor supply. In other words, the respondents who are
62 or 63 just react differently to health shocks than those who are 60 and 61. In order
to demonstrate why this should not be the case, I perform a placebo test. This test
involves using just the subgroup of respondents who are not ESS in period t. Currently,
the respondents in this group are 60 and 61 years of age. I now define fake Social Security
(FSS) to be used in the model instead of the original eligibility variable. The FSS variable
is zero for respondents who are 60 and one for respondents who are 61. This test is similar
to one performed by Finkelstein [53]6. The results from using this FSS variable are
presented in Panels A and B of Table 7 using the hours of work outcome and the working
outcome. Since no other avenue to leave employment is available for the respondents who
are FSS, there should not be a significant difference with how they react to a health shock.
For the most part, the results from this analysis are statistically insignificant. There is
one case which shows up as statistically significant: the first-difference model for hours
of work with women. While the size of the coefficient is smaller than the coefficients that
we have seen for the men in the previous analyses, and the result is only statistically
significant at the 10% level, it may suggest that the 61 year old women are reacting
differently to the health shocks when compared to the 60 year old women. However, this
result does not show up when using the working variable.
5.2 Falsification tests
Another issue with this type of analysis is that the treatment status, while undoubtedly
exogenous, is predictable. Respondents are aware of when they will turn 62 and may
adjust their behavior in anticipation of their treatment status changing. In order to
demonstrate that this is not the case, I also use a falsification test that involves testing
the treatment and interaction on a outcome which should not have been affected by the
6Finkelstein [53] uses this method with regards to a tax change, rather the Social Security eligibility,
but the principle is the same.
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treatment. In this case, I use the hours of work variable from period t−1 as the outcome
variable in equation (1). Since no respondents were eligible for Social Security in period
t− 1, the Social Security variable and interaction should have no effect on this outcome.
I also do this for the subset of respondent who have information on hours of work going
back to period t− 2 by using the difference in lagged hours of work in the first-difference
model. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 7. Again, the interaction variable is
not a significant predictor of this outcome for either men or women. Despite the fact that
one of the placebo tests showed up a statistically significant result for women, the overall
body of evidence presented in this table seems to suggest that it is the interaction between
health shock status and Social Security status which is causing the extra reductions in
labor supply for men but this interaction has a negligible effect for women.
5.3 Adjusting for the timing of health shocks
Currently, the health shock variable is constructed with regards to the most recent
diagnosis of the health condition. This is potentially a problem for two reasons. First
of all, it does not distinguish between respondents who have a health shock in period t
and respondents who have a health shock in period t and period t − 1. In other words,
it does not distinguish between respondents who have suffered health shocks in multiple
periods and those who have just suffered them in one period. Second of all, it may not
capture the immediate effect of a health shock on labor supply if it does not account for
people who may have had a health shock 10 - 15 years ago, have now returned to work,
and have suffered a new health shock before becoming eligible for Social Security.
A way of dealing with this is to use another variable in the HRS which asks the
respondents “Have you ever been diagnosed with one of the following conditions ... ?”.
Any previous health shock that a respondent may have suffered will be recorded under
this variable, whether it happened in the last wave or some period even further back.
Using this definition of a health shock in the analysis to capture new diagnoses will
ensure that a) we observing only one transition from not having a health shock to having
a health shock and b) we are observing the most recent health shock that it is possible to
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observe with the data at hand. This addresses both of the concerns related to the original
definition of the health shock that was listed above. I now redo the analysis from Tables
3 and 4 using this new definition of health shocks. The results are presented in Table 8.
The magnitude of the interaction coefficients increases for men and remains statistically
significant. The interaction coefficients for women remain close to zero and statistically
insignificant. It appears that these results are robust to different definitions of a health
shock where timing may be a factor.
5.4 Subgroup analysis
As a final way to examine the robustness of the previous results, I now estimate the model
using only subgroups of the original sample. I do this by removing those respondents who
display “unhealthy” characteristics in period t − 1. This includes those in poor health,
those who have ever smoked, those who currently smoke, those who drink alcohol, and
those who are obese. The first reason is that these are the variables which are considered
risk factors for the health shocks that are included in the analysis. Removing respondents
who display these characteristics may remove a portion of the sample who are driving
the results. If the subgroup who are driving the results can be found then any policies
that are developed to help these workers can be targeted at the appropriate group. The
second reason for excluding these groups is the exogenity assumption discussed in Section
3. While I argued that this assumption is satisfied for the entire sample, it is harder to
justify that this assumption is still met when focusing on smaller subgroups of the main
sample. However, if we are focusing on the groups which are relatively healthier then
the health shock is more likely to be considered exogenous in it’s own right, without
relying on the assumptions from Section 3. Table 9 presents the results of the 5 separate
subgroup analyses conducted for both men and women with the OLS and FD models.
The interaction between whether the respondent suffered a health shock and whether
they are eligible for Social Security is statistically significant at the 5% level in 9 out of
the 10 tests for men. It is not significant at the 10% level in 9 out of the 10 tests for
women. Overall, this final set of robustness tests reaffirms the effects that the interaction
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between health shock status and Social Security status has on male and female labor
supply.
6 Discussion
6.1 How should these results be interpreted?
Throughout the analysis it has been consistently shown that the interaction between
health shocks and being eligible for Social Security has a significant negative effect on
labor supply for men but it has little to no effect for women. Why is this the case? A
potential explanation for what this negative effect is measuring is men who would have
normally returned to work after a health shock but now have an extra pathway to reduce
their labor supply. To see this, look at the results presented in Table 4. In Panel A, the
coefficient on health shocks shows the effect that a health shock has on hours of work for
those who are still working and ineligible for Social Security. For both men and women
the coefficients are close to 1 in absolute terms and none are statistically significant.
However, Panel B clearly shows that if you are a man who has a health shock, and you
are eligible for Social Security, then the probability that you stop working increases by
between 6 and 10 percentage points over and above being eligible for Social Security,
even after taking the direct effect of the health shock into account. To see how these
results are linked, consider that for some respondents, the effect of the health shock on
their health is so bad they have to withdraw from the labor market, regardless of whether
or not they are eligible for Social Security. There will also be some respondents whose
health is negatively effected by the health shock but could still return to work if they
had to. If these respondents are not eligible for Social Security then they return to work
and they report working similar hours to those who have not had a health shock. This
is what the results in Panel A show. However, if these respondents are eligible for Social
Security, then they will be able to withdraw from the labor market. This is what the
results in Panel B show. In both cases, the men would like to leave the labor market
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because their health has been badly affected but only those who are eligible for Social
Security have to the ability to do so.
6.2 Is there evidence to support this explanation?
If it is the case that the group of men who are just below the Social Security eligibility
threshold are waiting to become eligible in order for them to leave the labor market, then
I would expect them to report that their health has been affected. There is a binary
variable in the HRS which asks whether or not your health is limiting the amount or kind
of work you can do. I now regress this variable on health shock status for those who are
still working in period t. The results are presented in Table 10. For the men who are still
working in period t, and are ineligible for Social Security, those who have a had a health
shock are almost 11 percentage points more likely to report that their health is limiting
their work. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Women who have
had a health shock are 2 - 4 percentage points more likely to report that their health
is limiting their work, though the results are not significant. It is also possible to break
these results down based on whether or not the respondents report themselves as doing
a physical job. As expected, men who have suffered a health shock in physical jobs are
17 - 18 percentage points more likely to report that their health is limiting their work.
Again, these results are significant at the 1% level. It should also be noted that men
who have a health shock and do not work in physical jobs are more likely to report that
their health is limiting their work, though the effect is smaller at around 7 percentage
points. For women, regardless of whether they are working in a physical job or not, the
effect of a health shock on whether their health is limiting their work is close to zero or
statistically insignificant. These results help to explain the mechanism behind the results
from the main body of the paper: being eligible for Social Security has an effect on men
who have had a health shock since their ability to work has been effected by the health
shock; however, it does not have an effect on women since the women who return to work
seem to show no ill effects of the shock.
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6.3 Why are these results important?
It has now been shown that men who return to work after a health shock report working
the same number of hours as those who have not had a health shock. However, they are
much more likely to report that their health is limiting their work than those who have
not had a health shock. Also, the group who are statistically equivalent to them leave
the labor market once they become eligible for Social Security. Taken altogether, these
results suggest that while these men are working, they may still be recovering from their
health shock. The commonly used term in the literature for continuing to work while
sick, or recovering from illness, is presenteeism. Presenteeism is a topic which has received
an increasing amount of attention in the last 10 years for a number of reasons. Firstly,
studies have shown that the productivity losses from presenteeism can actually be greater
than those of absenteeism. A recent literature review found that it was presenteeism, not
absenteeism, or pharmacy costs, or medical costs, that accounted for the majority of the
costs of health conditions to firms for a number of well known illnesses [54]. Secondly,
presenteeism has been shown to be risk factor for future work absences due to sickness,
as well as for decreases in self-reported health [55]. In situations like these, both the
firm and worker may benefit from an extended recovery period for the worker. Finally,
new research has also focused on policies that can reduce presenteeism. For example,
Pichler and Ziebarth [56] recently found evidence to this effect by showing that the
implementation of sick pay mandates which allowed workers to take sick days reduced
contagious presenteeism in cities in the U.S. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of
presenteeism in the HRS, something which is not uncommon in this literature (see Jones
et al. [57] for a recent example). However, the fact that male workers report that their
health limits their work, and that they are even more reactive to becoming eligible for
Social Security than healthy workers, is consistent with the idea that the men are not
working at full capacity.
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6.4 How do these results compare to other studies?
Concerning the other studies in the literature, there is no discernible pattern for how
workers’ hours of work change when they return to work after a health shock. For
example, Cai et al. [16] finds that health shocks reduce hours of work for men and
women by approximately 1 - 2 hours per week for those whose health was made worse
by the health shock. However, respondents whose health was made much worse by the
health shock reduce their hours of work by 7 - 9 hours. Trevisan and Zantomio [26] find
that there is no adjustment in hours of work for women who return after a health shock.
They also find that male full-time workers work more hours after suffering a health shock
but male part-time workers work fewer hours. Meanwhile, Jones at al. [23] find that there
is no reduction in hours of work in the year directly after the health shock for either full-
time or part-time workers. They do, however, find a reduction of approximately 2.5 hours
in the subsequent year. Focusing on cancer specifically, Candon [32] finds no difference in
hours of work between those who return after the health shock and the healthy workers.
Since the evidence from these papers is mixed, it is reassuring that the results found here
are clear and robust. It also suggests that other studies who find no effect on hours of
work for workers who return may be overlooking the fact that the workers may not be
working to the same capacity as the healthy workers.
6.5 What are the policy implications arising from these results?
To see how these results can help inform future policy decisions the focus must turn to
the mechanism behind the results. To this end, the contrast between the results for men
and women can be particularly illuminating. Remember that throughout the analysis
the interaction coefficient was negative and significant for men but close to zero and
insignificant for women. Also, men were reporting that their health was limiting their
work after the health shock but this was not case for women. Regardless of whether they
were in a physical job or not, the women who returned to work after the health shock were
no more likely than the non-health shock workers to report that their health was limiting
their work. This can explain why, once the negative effect from the health shock has been
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differenced away, the health shock women react to becoming eligible for Social Security in
the same way that the non-health shock women do. Why do women not report that their
health is limiting their work after a health shock? A potential explanation for this is that,
because of women’s historically weaker attachment to the labor market, they may only
return to work once they are fully recuperated from their health shock. Men, because
of their historically stronger attachment to the labor market, are likely to return even if
they are not fully recovered. Because of this, they react in a different way to becoming
eligible for Social Security when compared to the other respondents. This suggests that
if men were to return to work at the point where their health was no longer limiting their
work then the interaction between the Social Security and health shock variables would
not show up as having such a negative effect.
Future policies designed to mitigate this behavior could be targeted towards making
sure more flexible working conditions are available. These policies could include reduced
daily hours, a reduced work week, or the option to work from home on certain days. In
situations like this, firms may benefit from employees working fewer hours at full capacity
rather than full hours at a reduced capacity, which then further delays recovery. In turn,
this could prevent immediate withdrawal from the labor market once the worker becomes
eligible for Social Security. This is particularly relevant considering that it is workers
who were working full-time in period t − 1, as opposed to part-time or are part-retired,
who reduce their labor supply once they become eligible for Social Security. The results
presented in Table 11 show that this reduction occurs for workers who are classified as
full-time by their own declaration (Panel A) and those working 40 hours a week (Panel D)
or greater than 40 hours a week (Panel E). If these men are trying to return at the same
level as they were at before the health shock then it may explain why we see such a huge
reduction in their labor supply once they become eligible for Social Security. Interestingly
though, the effect also doesn’t seem to depend on the insurance status of the respondents
as the effect is present for men with and without EPHI (for the FD model at least) and
is not present for women. So it does not appear to be driven by people who returned to
work simply to maintain their EPHI coverage.
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While the policies mentioned above directly effect the amount of time a worker would
spend in work, another important factor could be assisting workers in getting them access
to rehabilitative services. This factor was found to increase employment in working
women who had been diagnosed with breast cancer in a recent study by Neumark et
al. [34]. Given that cancer is one of the health shocks included in this analysis, this
accommodation could be used to help those who suffer from health shocks in general.
7 Conclusion
Despite the millions of people who suffer health shocks each year, and the millions of
people who become eligible for Social Security every year, very little is known about
the joint effect that being eligible for Social Security and suffering a health shock has
on labor supply. Using data from the HRS, I model work outcomes as a function of a
health shock, becoming eligible for Social Security, and their interaction. I find that male
workers who are diagnosed with a health shock, and are eligible for Social Security, reduce
their hours of work more than male workers who are just eligible for Social Security, even
after the effect of the health shock has been differenced out. For women, I find that the
interaction has little to no effect on the number of hours worked. With respect to labor
market exits, the same pattern arises: men who are who are diagnosed with a health
shock, and are eligible for Social Security, are more likely to leave the labor market than
male workers who are only eligible for Social Security, even after the health shock has
been accounted for. Again, the joint effect is zero for women. The effects are robust to
numerous specifications. The results appear to be driven by men who would have had to
return to work with impaired health. Policies that promote a more flexible work situation
for older men may alleviate these problems in the future. Further research should focus
on the reasons behind why men report that their health limits their work when they
return to work but women do not. Such research could help shed valuable light on the
exact mechanism behind the results found in this study.
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Tables
Table 1: Age distribution
Age in period t ESS Men Women
60 No 1,592 1,608
61 No 1,606 1,673
62 Yes 1,533 1,439
63 Yes 1,229 1,287
Total 5,960 6,007
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Men Women
No HS HS No HS HS
Not ESS ESS Not ESS ESS Not ESS ESS Not ESS ESS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period t− 1
Non-white 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.16
College 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.45
Married 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.62
HS 0.02 0.02 0.71 0.71 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.79
Poor health 0.10 0.09 0.26 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.26
Smoker (ever) 0.66 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.57
Smoker (now) 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.22
Drink alcohol 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.49
Obese 0.27 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.31
Working spouse 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.37
Self-employed 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
EPHI 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.64
Physical job 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36
Hours of work 43.12 41.82 43.52 42.23 35.93 34.99 36.32 35.33
IHS (earnings) 9.89 9.57 10.15 10.00 9.71 9.47 9.79 9.72
IHS (HH income) 11.86 11.84 11.93 11.90 11.59 11.57 11.55 11.54
Period t
Working 0.87 0.76 0.82 0.65 0.83 0.74 0.80 0.72
Hours of work 36.84 29.95 35.11 25.21 29.48 24.50 28.65 24.36
Age 60.49 62.44 60.53 62.46 60.51 62.46 60.52 62.50
Observations 2,455 2,028 743 734 2,553 2,083 728 643
Note: ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; EPHI - Employer provided health
insurance; IHS - inverse hyperbolic sine; HHI - household income. All variables measured as
proportions except for age (years), hours of work (per week), earnings and HHI (transformed
with IHS).
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Table 3: The Effect of ESS and HS on Hours of Work
Men Women
Panel A: Hours of work (Pooled model)
ESS -6.893*** -6.174*** -4.986*** -4.446***
(0.538) (0.541) (0.488) (0.492)
HS -1.729** -2.021* -0.833 -3.157***
(0.806) (1.031) (0.762) (1.077)
ESS*HS -3.015*** -3.139*** 0.692 0.853
(1.157) (1.124) (1.044) (1.025)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No Yes No Yes
Period t− 1 controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,960 5,960 6,007 6,007
Panel B: Hours of work (FD model)
ESS -5.242*** -5.271*** -3.936*** -3.940***
(0.544) (0.545) (0.505) (0.506)
HS -1.917** -1.813* -3.304*** -3.212***
(0.952) (0.964) (1.056) (1.057)
ESS*HS -4.554*** -4.663*** 0.226 0.101
(0.931) (0.934) (0.847) (0.847)
Wave dummies No Yes No Yes
Region dummies No No No No
Period t− 1 controls No No No No
Observations 5,960 5,960 6,007 6,007
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * Result
significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at
the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Table 4: Using Different Work Outcomes
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work (if working)
ESS -2.375*** -2.006*** -1.466*** -1.127***
(0.367) (0.384) (0.325) (0.348)
HS 0.760 0.634 -0.714 -1.164
(0.607) (0.629) (0.683) (0.738)
ESS*HS -1.165 -1.463** 0.343 0.510
(0.740) (0.676) (0.647) (0.551)
Observations 4,781 4,781 4,692 4,692
Panel B: Working
ESS -0.105*** -0.099*** -0.092*** -0.091***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
HS -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.085*** -0.074***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026)
ESS*HS -0.065*** -0.096*** 0.018 -0.006
(0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
Observations 5,960 5,960 6,007 6,007
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain wave and region dummies and the period t − 1 control variables. The FD
regressions contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant
at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS -
Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Table 5: Using Different Ages
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work (for ages 61 - 62)
ESS -4.320*** -3.822*** -3.317*** -2.833***
(0.730) (0.720) (0.669) (0.669)
HS -2.077 -2.073 -6.126*** -6.086***
(1.435) (1.289) (1.456) (1.425)
ESS*HS -3.354** -4.601*** 1.025 -0.232
(1.542) (1.269) (1.423) (1.135)
Observations 3,139 3,139 3,112 3,112
Panel B: Hours of work (for ages 59 - 64)
ESS -6.616*** -5.642*** -4.646*** -4.112***
(0.492) (0.499) (0.441) (0.456)
HS -2.523*** -2.177** -2.805*** -2.993***
(0.895) (0.860) (0.913) (0.901)
ESS*HS -2.761*** -4.330*** 0.598 -0.089
(1.023) (0.902) (0.932) (0.821)
Observations 7,741 7,741 7,939 7,939
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables.
The FD regressions contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social
Security; HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Table 6: Using Different Health Shock Definitions
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work (health shock is only lung disease)
ESS -6.198*** -5.467*** -4.438*** -3.883***
(0.542) (0.564) (0.493) (0.522)
HS -1.697 -0.815 -4.374** -2.644
(2.103) (1.698) (1.878) (1.718)
ESS*HS -4.851* -8.726*** 2.487 -0.619
(2.490) (1.965) (1.878) (1.485)
Observations 4,779 4,779 4,997 4,997
Panel B: Hours of work (health shock is only cancer)
ESS -6.126*** -5.541*** -4.405*** -4.031***
(0.542) (0.561) (0.493) (0.519)
HS -0.203 0.229 -0.132 0.129
(1.651) (1.480) (1.659) (1.541)
ESS*HS -2.303 -3.241** 0.154 -0.267
(1.867) (1.571) (1.545) (1.229)
Observations 4,879 4,879 5,148 5,148
Panel C: Hours of work (health shock is only heart problems)
ESS -6.195*** -5.265*** -4.435*** -4.007***
(0.541) (0.554) (0.493) (0.518)
HS -2.239* -1.176 -1.890 -2.029
(1.295) (1.192) (1.446) (1.399)
ESS*HS -2.303* -4.722*** 0.782 -0.550
(1.392) (1.143) (1.436) (1.189)
Observations 5,374 5,374 5,273 5,273
Panel D: Hours of work (health shock is only stroke)
ESS -6.178*** -5.516*** -4.410*** -4.053***
(0.543) (0.567) (0.494) (0.527)
HS -4.264 -1.266 -7.330*** -4.271*
(2.805) (1.927) (2.807) (2.227)
ESS*HS -3.642 -8.946*** -0.508 -4.518*
(3.719) (2.764) (3.247) (2.553)
Observations 4,611 4,611 4,746 4,746
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables.
The FD regressions contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social
Security; HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Table 7: Placebo and Falsification Tests
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Placebo test on hours of work
FSS -2.305*** -1.790*** -0.241 -0.154
(0.662) (0.649) (0.611) (0.605)
HS -2.533* -2.831** -2.712* -3.441***
(1.376) (1.228) (1.404) (1.334)
FSS*HS -0.619 -1.506 -1.879 -1.971*
(1.456) (1.101) (1.293) (1.029)
Observations 3,198 3,198 3,281 3,281
Panel B: Placebo test on working
FSS -0.039*** -0.032** -0.006 -0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
HS -0.071** -0.066** -0.077** -0.078**
(0.029) (0.026) (0.036) (0.034)
FSS*HS -0.009 -0.031 -0.034 -0.032
(0.030) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024)
Observations 3,198 3,198 3,281 3,281
Panel C: Falsification tests using hours of work (t− 1)
ESS -1.269*** -0.958*** -0.732*** -0.374
(0.296) (0.371) (0.279) (0.341)
HS 0.507 0.236 0.598 1.928**
(0.590) (0.606) (0.695) (0.794)
ESS*HS -0.061 -0.036 -0.275 -0.137
(0.616) (0.522) (0.589) (0.510)
Observations 5,960 4,701 6,007 4,725
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The regressions
contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables. * Result
significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at
the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; FSS - Fake Social Security.
FSS is zero for respondents who are 60 and one for respondents who are 61.
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Table 8: Adjusting for the Timing of Health Shocks
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work
ESS -6.122*** -5.271*** -4.283*** -3.820***
(0.539) (0.544) (0.487) (0.502)
HS -2.714** -3.121** -4.404*** -4.568***
(1.275) (1.249) (1.270) (1.311)
ESS*HS -3.468*** -4.787*** 0.211 -0.384
(1.134) (0.936) (1.056) (0.865)
Observations 5,959 5,959 6,003 6,003
Panel B: Hours of work (if working)
ESS -2.308*** -1.933*** -1.465*** -1.112***
(0.363) (0.380) (0.323) (0.348)
HS 1.081 0.667 -1.306 -1.718*
(0.709) (0.734) (0.831) (0.924)
ESS*HS -1.483* -1.823*** 0.350 0.447
(0.761) (0.704) (0.664) (0.561)
Observations 4,781 4,781 4,690 4,690
Panel C: Working
ESS -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.087*** -0.089***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
HS -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.114*** -0.111***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.034) (0.033)
ESS*HS -0.073*** -0.098*** -0.002 -0.014
(0.025) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Observations 5,959 5,959 6,003 6,003
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables.
The FD regressions contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social
Security; HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
42
Table 9: Health Related Subgroup Analysis
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work (excluding respondents in poor health in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.553*** -4.394*** 0.785 0.500
(1.250) (1.040) (1.145) (0.958)
Observations 5,151 5,151 5,204 5,204
Panel B: Hours of work (excluding respondents who have ever smoked in t− 1)
ESS*HS -4.017** -4.207** 1.947 2.002
(2.043) (1.736) (1.479) (1.234)
Observations 1,890 1,890 2,951 2,951
Panel C: Hours of work (excluding respondents who smoke in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.239*** -4.319*** 2.061* 1.405
(1.235) (1.021) (1.132) (0.930)
Observations 4,796 4,796 4,912 4,912
Panel D: Hours of work (excluding respondents who drink alcohol in t− 1)
ESS*HS -2.605 -5.165*** 1.367 0.666
(1.903) (1.570) (1.448) (1.202)
Observations 1,984 1,984 2,809 2,809
Panel E: Hours of work (excluding respondents who are obese in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.961*** -5.018*** -0.020 0.078
(1.314) (1.109) (1.244) (1.044)
Observations 4,356 4,356 4,261 4,261
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled regressions
contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables. The FD regressions
contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level.
*** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; FD -
First-differences.
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Table 10: The effect of HS on your ability to work for workers who are not ESS
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Whether your health limits your work
HS 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.038 0.023
(0.024) (0.027) (0.030) (0.037)
Observations 2,729 2,729 2,660 2,660
Panel B: Whether your health limits your work (physical jobs)
HS 0.166*** 0.175*** 0.011 0.015
(0.045) (0.049) (0.052) (0.067)
Observations 1,007 1,007 911 911
Panel C: Whether your health limits your work (non-physical jobs)
HS 0.073*** 0.067** 0.051 0.024
(0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044)
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,746 1,746
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain a lagged value of the dependent variable, wave dummies, region dummies,
and the period t − 1 control variables. The FD regressions contain wave dummies. * Result
significant at the 10% level. ** Result significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the
1% level. HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Table 11: Policy Relevant Subgroup Analysis
Men Women
Pooled FD Pooled FD
Panel A: Hours of work (respondents who work full-time in t− 1)
ESS*HS -4.042*** -5.876*** 1.044 -0.172
(1.252) (1.042) (1.339) (1.110)
Observations 5,100 5,100 4,126 4,126
Panel B: Hours of work (respondents who work part-time/part-retired in t− 1)
ESS*HS 1.703 1.314 -0.077 0.228
(2.422) (1.727) (1.474) (1.155)
Observations 860 860 1,881 1,881
Panel C: Hours of work (respondents who work < 40 hours in t− 1)
ESS*HS -0.627 -1.616 0.669 -0.087
(2.023) (1.594) (1.304) (1.014)
Observations 1,048 1,048 2,556 2,556
Panel D: Hours of work (respondents who work 40 hours in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.828** -5.836*** 2.315 0.245
(1.745) (1.412) (1.699) (1.360)
Observations 2,450 2,450 2,439 2,439
Panel E: Hours of work (respondents who work > 40 hours in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.434* -4.797*** -3.375 -0.131
(1.887) (1.563) (2.963) (2.553)
Observations 2,462 2,462 1,012 1,012
Panel F: Hours of work (excluding respondents with EPHI in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.191 -5.124*** 1.886 0.341
(2.084) (1.688) (1.560) (1.300)
Observations 1,748 1,748 2,361 2,361
Panel G: Hours of work (including respondents with EPHI in t− 1)
ESS*HS -3.113** -4.357*** 0.382 0.061
(1.333) (1.119) (1.340) (1.105)
Observations 4,212 4,212 3,646 3,646
Note: All models estimated by OLS. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The Pooled
regressions contain wave dummies, region dummies, and the period t − 1 control variables.
The FD regressions contain wave dummies. * Result significant at the 10% level. ** Result
significant at the 5% level. *** Result significant at the 1% level. ESS - Eligible for Social
Security; HS - Health shock; FD - First-differences.
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Figure 1: Health comparison (Men)
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Figure 2: Health comparison (Women)
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Appendix
Table A1: Sample information
Exclusion criteria Observations
Unrestricted sample 207,816
Not working in period t− 1 139,408
ESS in period t− 1 21,459
Claiming SSDI or SSI in period t− 1 412
Younger than 60 or older than 63 in period t 32,347
Reporting no hours when working (and vice versa) in either period 300
Working more than 80 hours a week in either period 139
Missing information for control variables in t− 1 1,784
Restricted sample 11,967
Note: Observations refers to person-wave observations (i.e one individual in the survey for 10
waves appears as 10 observations). ESS - Eligible for Social Security; SSDI - Social Security
Disability Insurance; SSI - Supplemental Security Income.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics (Men)
No HS HS
Not ESS ESS Not ESS ESS
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period t− 1
Non-white 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34
College 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50
Married 0.86 0.35 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.88 0.33
HS 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45
Poor health 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43
Smoker (ever) 0.66 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.75 0.44
Smoker (now) 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.24* 0.43 0.20 0.40
Drink alcohol 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48
Obese 0.27** 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46
Working spouse 0.57** 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.54 0.50
Self-employed 0.20** 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.17* 0.38 0.21 0.41
EPHI 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45
Physical job 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48
Hours of work 43.12*** 11.41 41.82 12.45 43.52** 11.79 42.23 12.90
IHS(earnings) 9.89*** 3.96 9.57 4.17 10.15 3.66 10.00 3.85
IHS(HH income) 11.86 1.24 11.84 1.22 11.93 1.13 11.90 1.21
Period t
Working 0.87*** 0.33 0.76 0.42 0.82*** 0.38 0.65 0.48
Hours of work 36.84*** 18.08 29.95 20.58 35.11*** 19.60 25.21 21.96
Age 60.49*** 0.50 62.44 0.50 60.53*** 0.50 62.46 0.50
Observations 2,455 2,028 743 734
Note: ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; SD - Standard deviation; EPHI
- Employer provided health insurance; IHS - inverse hyperbolic sine; HHI - household income.
All variables measured as proportions except for age (years), hours of work (per week), earnings
and HHI (transformed with IHS). * Difference between columns (1) and (3), or columns (5)
and (7), statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Difference between columns (1) and (3), or
columns (5) and (7), statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Difference between columns
(1) and (3), or columns (5) and (7), statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics (Women)
No HS HS
Not ESS ESS Not ESS ESS
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period t− 1
Non-white 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.20* 0.40 0.16 0.37
College 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50
Married 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.49
HS 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.40
Poor health 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44
Smoker (ever) 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.49
Smoker (now) 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42
Drink alcohol 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50
Obese 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46
Working spouse 0.44** 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.42* 0.49 0.37 0.48
Self-employed 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
EPHI 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48
Physical job 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48
Hours of work 35.93*** 11.97 34.99 12.60 36.32 12.17 35.33 12.06
IHS(earnings) 9.71** 3.43 9.47 3.64 9.79 3.39 9.72 3.37
IHS(HH income) 11.59 1.32 11.57 1.17 11.55 1.24 11.54 1.18
Period t
Working 0.83*** 0.38 0.74 0.44 0.80*** 0.40 0.72 0.45
Hours of work 29.48*** 17.39 24.50 18.43 28.65*** 17.75 24.36 18.45
Age 60.51*** 0.50 62.46 0.50 60.52*** 0.50 62.50 0.50
Observations 2,553 2,083 728 643
Note: ESS - Eligible for Social Security; HS - Health shock; SD - Standard deviation; EPHI
- Employer provided health insurance; IHS - inverse hyperbolic sine; HHI - household income.
All variables measured as proportions except for age (years), hours of work (per week), earnings
and HHI (transformed with IHS). * Difference between columns (1) and (3), or columns (5)
and (7), statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Difference between columns (1) and (3), or
columns (5) and (7), statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Difference between columns
(1) and (3), or columns (5) and (7), statistically significant at the 1% level.
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